The majority population of Rakhine State consists of Buddhist Rakhine (or Arakanese), who are ethnically close to the Bamar (Burmans). The ethnocultural tensions between the Arakanese and the Rohingya on the one hand, and state policies of exclusion on the other, have been drivers of a lasting and violent conflict that reaches back to the late colonial period. From the 1980s onward, Myanmar's military and authoritarian state governments have described Rohingyas as a political and demographic threat and have increasingly deprived Rohingyas of their civic rights.
Anthropological field work investigating the Rohingyas as a culturally distinctive Muslim community is rare, and the access to essential information and documentation is limited. Background information in the media after 2012 has been mainly based on Rohingya pub lic presentations of their own identity, although extant sources suggest a history of multi layered communities and the formation of a Rohingya ethnopolitical movement as a re sponse to political and social challenges after 1948. At its origins, the Rohingya identity claims can be understood in a narrative context that includes the simultaneous rise of Rakhine Buddhist nationalism in the 1950s, and later, the political oppression and impov erishment that constrained the lives of both Buddhists and Muslims between 1962 and . Like most terms denoting social identity, Rohingya is an unstable signifier, poten tially pointing to various features of signification. Today, that term clearly operates inside PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, ASIAN HISTORY (oxfordre.com/asianhistory). (c) Oxford Univer sity Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see Privacy Pol icy and Legal Notice).
date: 14 September 2019 a historical process of ethnification among Muslims in Rakhine State. In addition, in the early 21st century, worldwide media reports have signified the Rohingyas as being state less victims of systematic oppression, whose refugee status and disenfranchisement are defining elements of their public identity.
Although the ethnoreligious tensions in Arakan had remained a marginal issue for decades, in the early 21st century, the worldwide media reports on the Rohingyas trans formed the case of their de facto statelessness into a cause célèbre in both Western and Muslim countries. Descriptions of the Rohingyas, therefore, must take into account the global media image of the "plight of the stateless Rohingyas." 4 Myanmar's state security services have reinforced such an image through their disenfranchisement and systematic oppression of the Rohingya people. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in the media to present these matters as if they were the only acceptable way in which to discuss the group. Although legal approaches grounded in activist agendas are significant, other as pects of these important and complicated issues merit further investigation.
The article has five sections. The first, "Muslims in Early Modern and Colonial Arakan," presents a historical background from the early modern to the colonial period, focusing on the role of Muslims at the time of the Buddhist monarchy and after the Burmese (1784) and British (1826) conquests. The second section, "The Rise of a Muslim National ist Movement," presents the political awakening of the North Arakan Muslims after World
War II and the rise of the Rohingyas as an ethnopolitical movement in the late 1950s. It is followed by "Muslim Imaginaire and Rohingya Ideology," an examination of the Rohingya concepts and ideas drawn from a Muslim imaginaire, as well as local history and archae ology. The fourth section, "Toward a Regime of Civic Exclusion and State Harassment,"
traces the record of Rohingya civic exclusion and state harassment under Burma's au thoritarian regimes. Following an increased awareness of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, the globalization of the Rohingya cause after 2012 has cast new light on the worldwide Rohingya diaspora, as discussed in the fifth section, "Rohingya Diaspora and the Globalization of a Muslim Minority Cause." Rather than a monolithic body of refugees, it appears as a transnational group of communities that have reinvented their lives in various geographical and political contexts. A final section, "Research Chal lenges," will specify some of the issues concerning research hinted at in this introduction.
Muslims in Early Modern and Colonial Arakan
Arakan is a strip of coastal plains, mangrove marshlands, and river valleys that connects Bangladesh to the deltaic landscape of Lower Myanmar. Shut off from the Irrawaddy Val ley to the east by a hinterland of steep forest-covered hills, it runs in a north-south direc tion along the eastern Bay of Bengal. The early modern Buddhist kingdom of Arakan had its own independent history centered on Mrauk U, an inland urban site overlooking the fertile Kaladan and Lemro valleys. At the margins of South and Southeast Asia, it borders on Muslim Bengal and Buddhist Burma. State in the early 21st century underscores a complex ethnoreligious setting. Inner cul tural and ethnic frontiers overlap but rarely converge with the political borders of the postcolonial nation-states.
History of Arakan/Rakhine State is at the heart of the ethnic claims that the Rohingya raised in the 1950s, but precolonial history did not predict the contemporary ethnocultur al conflicts and economic rivalries. Sources testify to a patchwork of Muslim presence since the early modern period. In the 15th century, the use of Muslim titles by Arakanese kings and inscribed coins suggests that the Bengal sultanate had a cultural impact on the court elite of Mrauk U. The cult of Sufi saints, venerated as the protectors of sailors and a resident community of Muslim traders, is also attested. Arakan's territorial expansion in the 16th century led to the conquest of Chittagong, Bengal's prosperous port ruled by Muslim lords since the 14th century. Until 1666, Chittagong's Muslim, Hindu, and Bud dhist populations were part of the Arakanese realm and a pillar of its economic power. 5 The systematic deportation of Bengali country folk supplied personnel for the court, no tably to till the royal lands around Mrauk U. It also fed a thriving slave trade. Local men likely served in the royal navy, which successfully resisted Burmese and Mughal attempts to crush Arakan's coastal hegemony. The percentage of Muslims in the general popula tion must have varied considerably. Western sources suggest a complex picture of the Muslim population, with privileged members serving at the court, a bigger group of bond ed labor, and a community of Muslim merchants from around the Indian Ocean. 6 The lin guistic traces of Arab and Persian in Arakan Muslims' eastern Bengali dialects point to these multifaceted contacts. With his works in Bengali embedding Persian narratives in Sanskrit poetic forms, the poet Alaol stands out as an eminent representative of the Mus lim elite at the Arakanese court.
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When the kingdom's political star waned in the late 17th century, most of the traders left.
Arakan became a regional backwater. Muslim guards were still playing a prominent role in removing and installing kings, but the region earned a dismal reputation as a pirates' nest. Paton's estimates most likely reflect the fact that Muslims had a strong presence in those places where British administrators became active (namely, North Arakan, Akyab, and Mrauk U). The context further suggests that Muslims proficient in several languages played a significant role as informers since 1823, when the British started to prepare for an invasion of Burma. 13 The theory that Buddhist-Muslim communalism became a driver of social disintegration in the country since the early 19th century seems doubtful as, un like today, the precolonial sociopolitical order prioritized functional rather than ethnic be longing.
14 Rapid demographic and economic changes took place after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The new maritime corridor acted as a powerful stimulus for the export of rice and conditioned a growing demand for labor. Chittagonians came massively for the sea sonal work, but many settled permanently in the country. The seasonal moves were recorded only partially by the colonial administration, while the rapid increase of the newly resident Muslims was documented in the census reports of 1881 , 1891 , 1911 , 1921 , and 1931 . Between 1881 and 1941 , the percentage of the Muslim population grew steadily, reaching 27 percent of the total.
15
Paying close attention to the linguistic, religious, and ethnic classifications in British cen sus reports and their changes over the decades is essential to any discussion about the mixed Muslim population. The criteria that prevailed in the first reports were religious identity ("Muslim") and linguistic group ("Bengali"). post-1826 arrivals and the latest wave of new migrants from Chittagong Division. The 1921 and 1931 censuses, however, differentiated among these two (and other smaller) Muslim groups. Members of the reputedly old Muslim community were referred to as "Arakan Mahomedans," according to their wish, and put into a newly created racial cate gory of "Indo-Burman" (numbering 51,615 in 1931) , while the larger, but relatively re cent, Muslim community was called "Chittagonians" (numbering 252,152) and was racial ly classified as "Indians."
16 Detailed information about how these two groups progressive ly merged is lacking, but regional and political differences persisted until the early 1960s, and probably beyond.
Chittagonian migrant labor and their descendants formed 80 percent of the total Muslim population. In 1931, three-quarters of them had already been born in Arakan, but they were perceived as foreigners, with no deep roots in the country. 17 The next section will describe how the political mobilization of the Muslims of North Arakan led to the birth of the Rohingya movement.
Rise of a Muslim Nationalist Movement, 1942-1964
There Quoting these variants is not a superfluous point. They show that the term had not been put into writing previously, but rather was in oral use among people who pronounced it differently and still were unsure about how to spell it. Although historical linguistics can explain its derivation from Ra(k)khanga, a literary Pali term, nonscientific etymologies have flourished, linking Rohingya to Arabic words and even Arakanese expressions. Cer tainly, it was not an invention, but with its adoption by a group of tightly knit nationalists, it was instantly impregnated with the group's political messages. Sultan Mahmud dis agreed. He may have shared the political objectives of the younger nationalist generation, but he remained opposed to the choice of a distinctive yet divisive ethnonym to denote the Arakan Muslim community. lim Organisation ultimately was ready to compromise and accept the creation of an Arakan state if the Muslims were given religious, cultural, economic, political, and educa tional guarantees.
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The Jam'iyyat ul-Ulama also gave detailed conditions under which it was ready to accept an Arakan state. But the creation of that state was still perceived by Rohingya leaders as a bad political option, as it implied the risk that North Arakan Muslims had to coexist with the Arakanese under an unsympathetic administration controlled by Buddhists. In 1960 and 1961, Rohingya speakers expressed widespread opposition. Yet it was not the Rohingyas, but rather the military putsch of March 2, 1962 , that spoiled Arakanese Bud dhist expectations. The Arakan state did not come into existence before 1974.
In the short run, the Muslims were the political winners. In early May 1961, following months of consultation, U Nu's government created the special Mayu Frontier Adminis tration (MFA) to satisfy Muslim demands. It included the areas dominated by Muslims (i.e., Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and a part of Rathedaung township). The surrender of the last few hundred Mujahids in July and November 1961 hailed a return to political stability in the region, and it went with an official declaration by the deputy chief of defense, Brigadier General Aung Gyi, recognizing the Rohingyas as an ethnic group despite the relatively recent adoption of this name. The Rohingya leadership in Maungdaw saw the creation of the MFA as the beginning of a "new era" and an explicit recognition of Ro hingya ethnic claims.
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Yet while the MFA, run by army officers in Rangoon, offered a separate status, it was hardly the type of self-administration for which the Muslims had fought. The MFA looked rather like an administrative refashioning of the Frontier Areas Administration (FAA), cre ated by General Ne Win during his caretaker regime (1958) (1959) (1960) . The FAA should have improved the economic and social development of the region, but primarily it extended the army's sway over an ill-controlled border region seen as a hideout for rebels and smugglers and an open gate for migrants from Pakistan. The border agreement with Pak istan concluded in 1961 had a similar purpose. In 1964, two years after the putsch, the MFA was reintegrated into the Akyab (now Sittway) district by General Ne Win's adminis tration.
Although the MFA died an early death, the ideas and motives of the Rohingya organiza tions did not. Having emerged as a group of political enthusiasts who competed with the pragmatism of the older generation of Muslim notables, the Rohingyas were nonetheless more than a radical movement. Unlike their predecessors, who had brought to mind his torical nostalgia and war memories to demonstrate their Muslim roots and prowess, the Rohingyas stepped up efforts in English-language (and less so in Burmese-language) me dia to inspire their movement with a set of core beliefs. By fusing their ethnic identity claims with their political goals and a record of the past, they attempted to mirror the causes of other ethnic minority groups who were looking for recognition and a state of their own within the Union. Such was the case of the ethnic Mon, and more visibly the loathed Arakanese Buddhist nationalists, who struggled for increased rights and autono 
Muslim Imaginaire and Rohingya Ideology
North Arakan's Muslim leaders believed that the best way to escape a Buddhist-dominat ed administration would be to obtain a separate status for the area, in which Muslims would form a majority. Yet their vision of territorial autonomy and cultural self-expression was not inclusive, as it disregarded the voices of other Muslim communities in Arakan. They cut across this diversity by defining an encompassing Muslim identity called Ro hingya, which included the majority of Muslims in past and present Arakan-with the sole exception of the tiny Kaman minority, which had its own genealogy harking to the 17th century. By drawing on colonial authors who referred to Portuguese and Dutch sources containing information about the economic and political roles of Muslims in the Mrauk U kingdom, the Bengali literary heritage of Mrauk U's 17th-century court, and legendary stories, Rohingya writers imagined a historical Muslim community that they tried to con dense into a coherent historical account. The historical approach of the Rohingya was entirely different, as they promoted the Ro hingya identity as one of Muslims in Arakan on the basis not of a shared culture, but of a localized ethnicity. To do so, citing proof of relatively late source material appeared to be insufficient. An arrival of Arab and Persian ancestors in the first millennium CE, there fore, was derived from legendary stories, Muslim lore, and Arakanese chronicles. Later
Rohingya writers argued that Rohingyas qualify as the descendants of the early inhabi tants of the country, who used Sanskrit for their inscriptions, thus preceding the arrival of the ethnically Tibeto-Burman Arakanese. Such assertions have provoked the ire of Bud dhists, whose religious self-identity is rooted in similar beliefs about Aryan ancestors.
For the Muslims of Arakan, the originality of the Rohingya narrative lay in its streamlined account of the past. Such an account did away with regional ethnic and cultural connec tions while lending ideological support to the Rohingyas' ethnic claims, which were meant to make them acceptable in Burma. These claims ultimately failed-but, since the late 1950s, the historical narrative generated by the Rohingyas has contributed to a dy namics of ethnification that has furthered a Muslim group identity in the face of the au thoritarian military rule, as well as in the diaspora.
Defining Rohingyas as an ethnic group that existed since antiquity was problematic, but it was posited as a historical certainty and saturated with the thick cultural meanings of an imagined collective past. In the 1950s, the Rohingyas were not fighting to be acknowl edged as citizens, as the 1947 constitution indeed offered them access; rather, they want ed to be accepted as a national race (taingyintha) so that they could claim their own terri tory. Only acceptance as a native community could pave the road to a constitutional recognition of ethnicity and national belonging. As Nick Cheesman argues in his analysis of how the Rohingyas failed to be included in national races, "the surpassing symbolic and juridical power of taingyintha [national race] is at once their problem and their solu tion." 33 By arguing from early on that they were a taingyintha population, the Rohingyas conformed to Burma's postindependence citizenship paradigm (the "solution"), but they faced an insurmountable challenge: to base their argument on historical claims, which were rejected by the authoritarian regime and were exceedingly difficult to prove.
Despite a show of acceptance during the brief MFA period, neither the authoritarian Burmese governments since 1962 nor any ethnic communities were ready to recognize the Rohingyas as a native community. In the early 21st century, the concept of taingyintha became even more entrenched in political parlance and a clear divider between "us" and "them." The detrimental effects of this political essentialization of ethnicity will be dealt with in the next section. The rest of this section will survey Rohingya historical writings, from their approach toward local Muslim history to their increasingly dogmatic turn. 39 Myanmar state harassment and persecution, described in the next section, have become increasingly prominent themes around the world in public discourse concerning Ro hingyas, and also in Rohingya self-representations of their own identity, reflecting their experience of torment and exclusion by the Myanmar government and their isolation from other groups in the country. That isolation has been further aggravated by Rohingya polit ical efforts to portray their own community as being more unified internally than seems justified historically based on the available records. 
Toward a Regime of Civic Exclusion and State Harassment
Burma/Myanmar's leaders and most of its inhabitants see their country as a historically shaped body of diverse people whose ethnicity determines their civic belonging. The Union Citizenship Act of 1948 defined national races as those groups that lived perma nently in the country before the First Anglo-Burmese War (i.e., before 1824). This ethni cization of civic status is generally taken for granted and has not been contested by multi ethnic group members. It is the political hegemony of the majority-Burman (Bamar) eth nic group that has led to decades of civil war between the government and ethnic minori ties, not the inflexible principle that ethnic belonging primarily determines civic rights. Unlike other groups with a hybrid historical or ethnic status in the country (e.g., the Chi nese in Kokang), the Rohingyas have been singled out for increasingly inequitable treat ment by the state.
In light of those who argue that the 1982 citizenship law made the Rohingyas de jure stateless, Cheesman has shown that hundreds of thousands of Muslims were rendered stateless by a "deliberate breach and selective application" of the law when it was ap plied after 1989. 41 The argument that their denationalization was the result of a deliber ate state policy has been advanced by Rohingyas for many years. In the 1950s, National Registration Cards (NRCs) were widely used as de facto proof of citizenship or nationali ty, but in the 1970s, North Arakan Muslims were no longer issued NRCs, and many NRCs were allegedly seized by the authorities. When a new citizenship regime was applied in the late 1980s, people had to relinquish their identity papers to obtain color-coded Citi zenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs), but after 1995, most Rohingyas were merely given Tem porary Registration Cards (TRCs), the so-called white cards, certifying that they were not full citizens. These TRCs were cancelled in February 2015. In June 2015, new green cards were distributed to those people who were ready to be scrutinized for citizenship under conditions that denied them self-identification as Rohingyas. This brief chronology illus trates both the arbitrary nature of the state's treatment of Rohingyas and their bureau cratic exclusion from citizenship.
What forces have been driving this process on the side of the central state? Based on a long record of human rights violations, a plethora of motives, stretching from racism and Islamophobia over security concerns to accusations of illegal immigration, can be alleged to account for systematic discrimination. Yet although these factors definitely played into each other, none can explain the vicious turn of state policies by itself, and a response can only be tentative. As it was the army that assumed the task of supervising the border re gion after independence, a possible way to search for an answer is to try to understand army border policies. The foremost aim of the army was to establish efficient control of the border, prevent smuggling, and check cross-border movement. as strategic threats, and although there were occasionally serious tensions and violent in cidents, efforts were made to settle border issues by negotiations.
Moreover, unlike in other regions at the country's periphery, the army did not face unsur mountable military challenges in Arakan. The Mujahids (1948 Mujahids ( -1961 and a succession of inconsequential Rohingya armed groups did not drag the army into endless warfare as the Karen, Shan, and Kachin rebellions did. The political control of the region was eased by the presence of two rival groups, giving the state the opportunity to play the ambitions and interests of the Arakanese Buddhists against those of the Muslims.
Arakan was an area of much lesser political concern for the army than the country's east ern periphery, bordering communist China. This situation at the western border prevailed until the mid-1970s. When the civil war in Bangladesh drove tens of thousands of refugees over the border, the Burmese government tolerated their presence at first, but it was wary that many would stay on, increasing the number of other illegal migrants that had reportedly settled in the rural countryside of North Arakan since independence.
In early 1978, shortly after the Burmese army's successful operations against Arakanese rebel groups, the government launched a campaign to arrest illegal migrants backed by security forces. It led to widespread panic in North Arakan's countryside and an exodus of nearly 200,000 people to Bangladesh. The Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), an armed organization, surmised that there was a premeditated plan to exterminate the Muslim community. Although most refugees were repatriated, thousands stayed in Bangladesh while many more moved to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. There is little doubt that the expe rience at the country's western border had an impact on the formulation of the 1982 citi zenship law, which enjoined people to apply once again for their citizenship. The law's an ti-Arakan Muslim bias did not escape anyone's attention; shortly after, it led to the foun dation of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, an armed movement, in Bangladesh.
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In 1965, 300,000 Indians had left Burma following the nationalization of private business es by General Ne Win, which entailed their exclusion from the country's economic and so cial life. The exodus had no direct impact on Arakan's mainly rural Muslim community. Nevertheless, Ne Win's socialist visions, which isolated the country economically and po litically, along with his nationalist, Burman-centric state ideology and Buddhist rigidity, tilted public opinion toward anti-Indian prejudice. Already firmly anchored in the national consciousness since the late colonial period, the mistrust between the Buddhist and Mus lim parts of the population was particularly deep in Arakan, offering state authorities the opportunity to exploit these tensions and resentment for their own advantage. Among the Burmese military, Bangladesh's population growth was perceived as a lasting threat to the thinly populated Arakan state. 43 In the early 1990s, tion efforts under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) faced resistance from many Rohingyas. Many ran away soon after their return because of forced labor and brutal violence, including rape and extortion. The verification procedures of the Burmese authorities were not facilitating the return of the refugees. The repatriation process slowed down after 1997 and came to an end in 2005. Two offi cial Rohingya camps with more than 30,000 people existed in Bangladesh. In 1992, the Burmese government considered many of the refugees as illegal migrants from Bangladesh who had no right to claim an identity that did not exist officially. The term Bengali was increasingly used by the authorities to refer to the community as a whole.
Throughout the 1990s, the policies of harassment perpetrated by the Nasaka, a mixed unit of police, intelligence, and customs officers, created increasing hardship for the Mus lim population. The authorities kept livelihood conditions low by failing to invest in eco nomic development and infrastructure. 44 Reduced freedom of movement, the introduction of restrictions on marriage and birth registrations, and the obstruction of religious prac tices pushed many people out of the country. At the same time, a project of model villages was launched to repopulate North Arakan with Buddhist settlers, including former prison ers. 45 After 2012, against this increasingly well-documented background, a new genera tion of pro-Rohingya advocacy groups reiterated the accusation that the government in tended the slow extermination of the Muslim population. President Thein Sein's reform policies did not bring an end to murky party politics, nor did the increasingly autonomous role played by the parliament and the courts break any new ground. Rather, it confirmed the high level of social and political exclusion of Ro hingyas in Myanmar. In September 2014, white-card holders were barred from being members of a political party, but the proposal of giving white-card holders voting rights was reiterated by the ruling USDP in February 2015. Once it was approved by the parlia ment, however, it was rapidly invalidated by Myanmar's constitutional court. Rohingya political leaders who had been candidates or elected MPs at the 1990 and 2010 elections readied themselves for the free elections of November 2015, but the court's final decision coincided with a widespread anti-Rohingya backlash following the 2012 communal vio lence and, more generally, a tide of Buddhist nationalism that swept across Myanmar from 2013 to 2015.
The outbreak of violence in 2012, which marked the beginning of a series of humanitari an crises in Rakhine State, was triggered by the rape and killing of a Buddhist woman at the end of May, followed in early June by the killing of a group of Muslims who were visit ing South Rakhine from another region. More violence erupted in the Muslim-majority area-Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung-in the north on June 8, followed by at tacks in the capital, Sittway. A state of emergency was declared, but security forces were later accused not only of failing to stop the violence, but of being complicit in it. Until mid-July, more than 100,000 people were reportedly displaced and resettled in IDP camps. Eighty people were killed, and more than 4,000 houses were destroyed. A second wave of violence, in October, spread over a much wider area in central Rakhine and led to another 80 dead, with 22,000 people displaced and more homes destroyed. More than 80 percent of the victims were Muslims.
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Since the 1990s, the outside world has increasingly taken notice of the plight of the Ro hingyas on both sides of the border due to greater international awareness of Myanmar's conflicts. Taking stock of the migration of Muslim people from Arakan to the neighboring countries and beyond during many decades, the next section will provide an overview of the Ro hingya diaspora, who have played a decisive role in the post-2012 globalization of the Ro hingya cause. been marked by difficulty. Many have had to subsist as a marginalized and largely desti tute community, referred to in mostly negative terms by the local media. While protesting and appealing to the international community for support when people crossed the bor der by the tens of thousands, Bangladesh has generally tolerated the arrival of refugees during moments of acute crisis. However, government plans announced in May 2015 to relocate thousands of Rohingyas to Hatiya Island in the Bay of Bengal were immediately criticized by both refugees and international organizations. 53 After the Myanmar military campaign in late 2016, 74,000 people fled from Rakhine State to Bangladesh as recently as February 2017. 54 They were followed at the end of August and early September 2017 by an exodus that totaled more than 500,000 following opera tions in Rakhine State by battle-hardened infantry troops. The Myanmar government re jected an international investigation of these events, which included the burning of hun dreds of villages and were internationally perceived as a campaign of ethnic cleansing, but also made a commitment to repatriation and to the implementation of recommenda tions made by an advisory commission headed by former United Nations (UN) secretary general Kofi Annan. The increasing global attention for the Rohingya cause in Myanmar may lead to a greater awareness of the huge Rohingya communities in the Asian region as well. Long-held polit ical stances and migratory policies toward the hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas in the diaspora may be further affected by the latest crisis outbreak. Bangladesh is a country that does not recognize Rohingyas as a self-identifying ethnic group (referring to them as "Myanmar nationals"), but at the same time, it is the country where many Rohingyas have successfully integrated, both socially and culturally. In 2011, an inquiry of the Danish Im migration Service (DIS) reported that "no distinctive physical features [existed] between Rohingya and Bangladeshis in the Cox's Bazar area," with "all the sources stat[ing] that the cultural and religious practices performed by the Rohingyas are similar to the local Bangla practices." 56 However, the report also portrayed them as "an extremely fragment ed group" that "does not speak with a unified voice." A French field researcher has de scribed middle-class Rohingyas as an "invisible" group in Chittagong's urban landscape. 57 Security interest in the Rohingya diaspora has been limited to risk evalua tions about Rohingyas being recruited by Islamist outfits in Bangladesh, India, or Pak istan.
The Rohingya Diaspora and the Globalization of a Muslim-Minority Cause
The expanding international conversation on Myanmar's democratic opening and discrim ination against the Rohingyas has already powerfully affected the transnational Rohingya ecosystem. The Arakan Rohingya Union, founded in Jeddah in 2011 under the auspices of the OIC, resuscitated the project of a federation of competing Rohingya organizations. The European Rohingya Council was registered in the Netherlands in 2012. 58 Recent Ro hingya self-representations have downplayed history-bound accounts of Rohingya identity and emphasized instead Rohingya victimization as Muslims. This shift in rhetorical strate gy seems adapted to social media, where even sympathetic readers may find it difficult to disentangle traditional historical arguments, ethnic identity ideas, and cultural terminolo gy.
59
Together with a loose alliance of pro-Rohingya human rights defenders and legal experts, Rohingya organizations have dropped the communal aspects, representing the conflict mainly as a "state/army versus ethnic minority" issue. The reiteration of itemized root causes (xenophobia, Islamophobia, cultural dissimilarity, socioeconomic tensions, and sys tematic state discrimination) in media analysis powerfully underscores the discursive shift from a local and historicized issue to a global cause owned by non-Rohingya ac tivists. As the globalization of the Rohingya cause has moved the political and moral de bate on Rakhine State issues from the national to the international level, it has eased calls for international intervention while further sidelining Buddhist and Muslim voices in Myanmar itself.
For the Rohingyas themselves, the ethnic claim is a certainty, a source of pride, and a show of resistance to oppression as well. It is in line with principles that the international community has agreed upon, making clear that the Muslim community has a right to selfidentify as Rohingyas. Rohingyas, therefore, should be fully recognized as Union citizens.
In the eyes of the Rakhine Buddhists and among Myanmar's political decision-makers, the claim that Rohingyas are a unique ethnic group remains unacceptable. For them, the Ro hingya identity stands out as the primary cause of the discontent, and the demographic threat looms large in their depictions. To be granted citizenship, people should undergo a process of verification in line with the 1982 law.
As things stand in early 2018, political realism suggests that social and political accep tance of Muslims identifying as Rohingyas remains at a far distance.
Research Challenges
With widespread accusations of genocide, the international outrage about the military ex actions in North Rakhine in 2017 had a strong impact on the prospect of political and eco nomic relations with Myanmar's government. The resulting international concern has fur ther contributed to an abundance of reports that focus on humanitarian aspects, the vio lation of human rights, and the statelessness of Rohingyas during the last four to five decades.
To appreciate the emergent Rohingya narrative from a contemporary vantage point, one must bear in mind that the early Rohingya writers were not aware of many facts brought to light since the 1980s by scholars who specialize in the Bay of Bengal's early modern period.
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Apart from historical studies that include the early modern and contemporary history of Muslims, there have been few studies of this topic in the field of social sci ences. The knowledge of cultural and religious practices is still limited to the description of Rohingya folklore. As mentioned previously, no research has been done on the East Bengali dialectology that would enlighten us on the regional linguistic variety. Writing about the Rohingyas remains, therefore, a challenging exploration of social, political, reli gious, economic, and cultural fields of inquiry, where no peer-certified academic dis course exists as yet. The small amount of academic work on Rohingya refugees leaves op portunities for anthropological research on the Rohingyas in their various national and political contexts. As Rohingya groups and organizations have been reticent to share in formation about themselves and their social, political, and organizational practices, the formation of an archive of documents and field observations is a major challenge by itself.
The dynamics of Rohingya identity formation are a primary concern, as the dogmatic selfstatements on the Rohingyas as a perennial group call for a critical approach to the con texts in which community-building processes took place. To explore the discontents in state-ethnicity and Buddhist-Muslim relations, there is a need to move beyond the eventsbased historical descriptions (which, for good reason, have taken up a large part of this article), as well as the dichotomous perpetrator-versus-victim perspective, by looking at each group as an entity empowered by various forms of agency.
There is a need not only to deepen, but also to broaden, the scope of investigation. The Rohingyas are the biggest Muslim community in Myanmar. Since the late 1990s, their case as a persecuted minority in the country has been presented in a narrative of human rights violations and failed civic rights that has diminished the interest in the de terioration of relations and the stunning lack of communication between Buddhists and Muslims. As observers prioritized the dichotomy of failed state-minority relations, the fact that in 2012, members of the two communities went at each other's throats was soon lost to oblivion.
To pave the road toward the peaceful coexistence of the two estranged communities, le gal approaches arguing for justice and in favor of Rohingya citizenship amount to one as pect of a larger challenge. 61 The 2016-2017 mass evictions have redrawn the borders of the Rohingya question itself, and the impact on national and international stances is such that it will never again be possible to treat the situation as just a national or regional is sue. Applied research drawing on the expertise of peace and ethnic conflict studies, as well as the most recent geopolitical approaches, is therefore needed to address the con temporary complications of the Arakan/Rakhine State conundrum.
Primary Sources
Primary sources considered for this article include published and unpublished documents in Burmese or Western languages. Urdu, Bengali, Arabic, and Malay sources may contain relevant information and call for further research. Burmese (including Arakanese/ Rakhine) and Western (mainly English) sources may be divided into those that provide in formation on the historical presence of Muslims in precolonial and colonial Arakan, and those that are essential to understand the Rohingyas as a self-defining ethnic and politi cally active group after independence. Rohingya historiography has heavily drawn on the Buddhist chronicle tradition of Arakan, creatively embedding both mythical and historical Islamic elements.
62
The Myanmar (1942 Myanmar ( -1948 , while referring to the de facto recognition of local "peace committees" as an "administrative body," concludes: "And this Administrative Body was given many pledges towards self-determination, on the model of autonomous Muslim State, in New Burma."
As the petitioners made reference to D. C. P. Phelps, the military administrator, and A. A. Shah, the civil advisor to Phelps, one may surmise that oral promises had been made, but without any written commitment by their superiors. (25.) The search for unity was a matter of political concern (Mohamed Akram Ali, "Unity Among Ourselves," The Guardian 1960, 31-32) . Therefore, the newly found unity was demonstrated in the names chosen by Rohingya organizations, such as the Rohangya Muslim United Front of Burma, United Rohingya National League, and United Rohingyas Organization, which published booklets (in Burmese) to explain the indigenous character of the Rohingya population during the early phase of the Mayu Frontier Administration (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) Trübner, 1883) and Geoffrey E. Harvey, History of Burma (London: Frank Cass, 1925 
